Though unbridled aestheticism poses such a danger, Paul enacts throughout the play a purposive, ontologically lucid "elaboration of the self" as the telos of life (Foucault, "Enlightenment" 40, 42) .
First of all, Paul gives primacy to the essentials of well living over the incidentals of controversial social issues:
But the world has been too heavy with the right-to-lifersprotect the unborn, constitutional amendments, when does life begin? Or the converse-the end of life, the right Pivot 1.1 to die. Why is life, at this point in time, so focused upon the very beginning of life and the very end of life? What about the years we have to live between those two inexorable book ends? (Guare 45) Central to the philosophical imperative of self-examination, as part of well living, is imagination (Guare 34). As Paul reveals, however, this important faculty has sadly "moved out of the realm of being our link, our most personal link, with our inner lives and the world outside that world, this world we share" (Guare 34):
The imagination has been so debased that imaginationbeing imaginative-rather than being the linchpin of our existence, now stands as a synonym for something A disciplined practice of the imagination also happens to be the "linchpin" of Foucault's ontology of the self as a modern subject. Following Baudelaire, Foucault defines modernity as "the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent" and being modern as "recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it" ("Enlightenment" 40). In this sense, modernity, "distinct from fashion, which does no more than call into question the course of time, ... is the attitude that makes it possible to grasp the 'heroic' aspect of the present moment" (40). In other words, Foucault's philosophical dandy tries to extract the poetry within the present by "pursuing the free play of imagination wherever it may lead" (Miller 878). In one of his last interviews, Foucault urges: "in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life.... But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?" ("Genealogy" 350).
Indeed, art objects are prevalent in Six Degrees as décor and subjects of conversation but, more importantly, as emanations of the human soul. In speaking of the double-sided Kandinsky, Flan explains the Russian artist's view that the process of aesthetic composition synaesthetically strikes the chords of the soul: "The choice of object that is one of the elements in the harmony of form must be decided only by a corresponding vibration in the human soul" (Guare 19) . Here, the musical (and thus mathematical) reference suggests an ideal of aesthetic unity toward which Foucault strived in his aspiration to the philosophical aesthete. Yet James Miller, à la Montaigne, cautions thus about Foucault's endeavour to become a work of art:
After all, a human being is not an inert object like the lamp or the house. So what is a human being to do about all those aspects of itself-those moments of irresolution, impulsiveness, inconstancy, inconsistency, weakness of will, and self-deception that, though unmistakably a part of one's life, can nevertheless not be fitted, without contradiction, into a whole that is organically unified? In modernity, art and ethics have not been easy bedfellows. An "inherent and perhaps irreconcilable conflict between art and morality or between aesthetic and ethical consciousness" arises, as Eliot Deutsch keenly observes, "from the recognition that, on the one hand, art and morality are kindred forms of spiritual life and, on the other, there are sharp differences between them and that, accordingly, they make opposing claims upon us" (81). Historically, as Deutsch explains, "[t] he dominant presupposition from the Hellenistic period to the Renaissance was simply that art was subservient to (or could in no way be separated from) the demands of morality, as theologically and politically defined and understood" (82). In modern times, however, "art has established its autonomy" simply as art:
Many (at least non-Marxist) aestheticians and critics today would even go so far as to say that the only "goodness" in art is of a strictly aesthetic kind. A work of art that is aesthetically right is simply "good" by virtue of this rightness-without moral remainder. We allow intrusions from the ethical into art only insofar as they can be taken over and entirely assimilated by purely aesthetic considerations. (Deutsch 82) In other words, it is the job of the artist "to add to the world objects and ideas-delineations, symphonies-which ought to be there, and whose end is contemplation and appreciation; things which deserve to become the focus of a truly disinterested affection" (Gass qtd. in Deutsch 82).
In an effort to reconcile aesthetics and ethics, Deutsch 
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Through the free play of his imagination, the Foucauldian subject works on the aesth/ethic "elaboration of the self" as the telos of life (Foucault, "Enlightenment" 40, 42) . Paul, the Foucauldian aesthete in Six Degrees, shows how imagination is there to sort out your nightmare, to show you the exit from the maze of your nightmare, to transform the nightmare into dreams that become your bedrock. If we don't listen to that voice, it dies. It shrivels. It vanishes…. The imagination is not our escape. On the contrary, the imagination is the place we all trying to get to. (Guare 34, (62) (63) emphasis added) The imagination, the power of the mind, is the means and end of the aesth/ethic self, which, according to Paul, desires such Platonic ideals as beauty, quality, and eternal friendship (Guare 112, 99) . Immanuel Kant, whose famous essay on enlightenment became a key pronouncement for the intellectual movement of that name, states that enlightenment through the exercise of reason is man's exit (Ausgang) from his self-incurred "immaturity" (Unmündigkeit), meaning a mental dependence on others. This exit is most effectively manifested through disenfranchisement-the loss of political voice-as implied by the literal sense of unmündig (Kant) .
Revising Kant's view on enlightenment, imagination, in Paul's conception, is both means and end. It is the "exit," "our out" (Guare 63, 62) engaging us in the ceaseless act of enlightening: "The imagination is the noon voice that sees Pivot 1.1 clearly and says yes, this is what I want for my life" (62). But because we are subject to whatever constraints our historic and cultural situation places upon us, "Our imagination teaches us our limits and then how to grow beyond those limits" (Guare 62) , in Paul's case, poverty, blackness, and homosexuality. In Foucauldian language, the "ontology of the self" entails "a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus ... work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings" ("Enlightenment" 47). Foucault, who uses Kant's essay to clarify his own views regarding reason, freedom, and the aesth/ethic imperatives of modern subjectivity, believes less in finding "an exit" from the limitations upon our lives than in "illuminating and critically testing" such limits through the possibilities of self-creation in daily life; freedom, though historically and circumstantially limited, offers "concretely possible transformation" (Seppä sections 6 and 3). Likewise, Paul affirms that disciplined imagination is not ultimately "our escape. On the contrary, the imagination is the place we are all trying to get to" (Guare 63), the site and practice of the aesth/ethic self in a contingent world.
To go beyond the economic, racial, and gendered limits imposed on his historically situated self, Paul commits himself, in Foucauldian terms, to the "ascetic elaboration of the self" through a "transfiguring play of freedom with reality" Once admitted, Paul successfully presents "a figure of artful wholeness" (Miller 888) with a "wild quality," according to Ouisa, "yet a real elegance and a real concern and a real consideration,"-a "dreamboat," in her daughter Tess's sneering words, who self-consciously strikes poses for Pivot 1.1 admiration, confessing "a thrill to be looked at" 38 hustler into the Kittredge residence. As he later explains, "I was so happy. I wanted to add sex to it" (108). This action repulses the Kittredges, who, in feeling their privacy violated, throw Paul back to the streets from whence he came (even as I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers who gave me the impetus to revamp my essay into what it is now-a more cohesive examination with a stronger theoretical framework.
1 At the play's end, Ouisa reminds Flan: "You were attracted to him .... Attracted by youth and his talent and the embarrassment prospect of being in the movie version of Cats," to which she refers earlier as being "star fuckers" (117, 30). For a gender reading on Flan's complex relationship with Paul, see Jennifer Gillan, who argues that he is "disturbed that his liberal sense of cross-racial identification (his ability not to notice Paul is black) may have crossed over into some erotic identification with Paul as homosexual" (62). Without specific mention of physical attraction, Elizabeth avows in the film version that Paul "opened up a whole new world to us." To be sure, the Kittredges do not respond identically to Paul.
Ouisa is the one more patently moved by Paul: "I just loved the kid so much. I wanted to reach out to him" (Guare 31 OUISA. You were attracted to him.
FLAN. Oh, please. Cut me out of that pathology right now.
(Six Degrees)
Whether or not Ouisa's concern for Paul is a "pathology," it is important to bear in mind here that Flan may be expressing himself more reservedly-despite his self-congratulatory statement, "We have hearts"-because he is speaking in public, as a former "lawyer ... If you do, I'll hang up and never bother you again-," Ouisa merely returns a solicitous question, implying that far from being betrayed, she has gained a whole new perspective on the "paltry" life they led and "envied" Paul's aesth/ethic mode of living more than he "envied us" (Guare 98, 117) . As the best tribute to his memory, Ouisa seeks to emulate him by taking on the "task of producing [her] self" (Foucault, "Enlightenment" 42) : to "keep the experience" (Guare 118) of Paul, by accounting for the brush strokes, by adding structure to the colour in her life. Although the connection to celebrity, like the knife wound that he fakes, gives Paul a ready audience, it is ultimately his self-fashioned, aesth/ethic "wizardry" (Guare 27 ) that enchants all who encounter him. are not enough to combat the dual limits of existential randomness and social inequalities within the judicial system that the New York traffic and the police station respectively emblemize. As Wilde, Foucault, and Guare suggest, the aesth/ethic pursuit of the self is enacted through disciplined
